Game-theoretical models of collective behavior are considered under the assumption that agents are different in their decision-making reflexion levels. The dependence between agents' partitioning in reflexion levels and stable outcomes of their interaction is explored. Two models -consensus problem and the stock market pricing -are given as the illustration of the reflexivity role.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, either of two assumptions about mutual awareness of agents is used in the game-theoretical models and/or collective decision-making models. Either all essential information and agents' decision-making principles are considered to be known to them and everyone knows that all of them know these (the so-called concept of common knowledge), or it is assumed that each agent follows some decision-making procedure and do not "think" about knowledge and behavior of the rest of the agents. The first approach is traditional for the game theory (see e.g. Myerson, 1991) , as well as the second one is conventional for the collective behavior models (see e.g. Malishevsky, 1998 and Opoitsev, 1977) . But there is a sufficiently large variety of probable situations between these two "extremes." Let us assume that some agent implemented an act of reflexion trying to predict the behavior of other agents and chooses its actions tacking into account this prediction -we suppose that this agent has the first rank (level) of reflexion. Another agent (possessing already the second rank of reflexion) can suppose that the first rank agents exist and predict their behavior and so on (see for example the survey of experiments in Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010) . The following questions arise. How the behavior of a collective of the agents depends on their distribution among the reflexion ranks, i.e. on that how much agents of one or another ranks there are in the collective? If the fractions of the reflexing agents can be controlled, then what are these fractions optimal in the view of one or another criterion of effectiveness determined at the set of the agents' actions? To answer these and other questions let us further introduce the method of reflexive partitioning of a set of rational agents acting together to the subsets corresponding to the different ranks of reflexion.
MODELS OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Consider the set N = {1, 2, …, n} consisting of n agents. The agent i chooses its action x i   1 . For simplicity, here and below, if not specified explicitly, we assume that the agents' actions are not restricted (below or above). The vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n )   n of the agents' actions called the game situation determines their gains defined by the goal functions F i (x), where
The rationality of the agent behavior consists in striving to maximization of its goal function by choosing its own action:
where
is the game environment for the i-th agent, BR i () is the best response of this agent, i  N. Let us suppose that the functions F i () are such that for any agent in any game environment there exists a unique best response. If we assume that the whole game description (the set of agents, their goal functions, and the set of admissible actions) is the common knowledge among the agents making decisions once, simultaneously, and independently, then we can use the concept of Nash equilibrium. Within the framework of this concept, the equilibrium is understood as a vector of actions x N such that an action of each agent is the best response to Nash environment:
As distinct from the game theory, the theory of collective (group) behavior is engaged in research of the dynamics of behavior of rational agents with rather weak assumptions on their awareness. Thus, e.g., availability of the common knowledge about the set of agents, sets of admissible actions, and goal functions of opponents to the agents is not always required. Or the agents are not obliged to predict the behavior of all the opponents as it takes place in the game theory (see above). Moreover, often the agents making decisions can "not know about existence" of other agents or have aggregated information about them. Therefore, considering the reflexive models of collective behavior and control, we will further be guided by the case when each agent possesses aggregated information about the results of activity of its opponents.
The model of indicator behavior (Opoitsev, 1977) is the most widespread model of the collective behavior dynamics. x , …, 0 n x ) is assumed to be given).
Each agent can compute its current goal position, which is its action that would maximize its goal function provided that at the current time interval all agents would choose the same actions as at the preceding interval:
Within the frameworks of hypothesis of indicator behavior each agent at each point of time will take a step from its preceding strategy to current goal position: The approaches of the collective behavior theory and the game theory are concordant in the sense that both theories research behavior of the rational agents (compare expressions (1) and (4)), and the game equilibriums, as a rule, are at the same time the equilibriums of the dynamic procedures of collective behavior (e.g., Nash equilibrium (2) is the equilibrium of dynamics (4) of collective behavior).
The strategical and informational reflexions are distinguished (Сhkhartishvili and Novikov, 2004) . The informational reflexion is the process and result of the agent thinking about awareness of other agents. The strategical reflexion is the process and result of the agent thinking about principles of other agents' decision-making.
Within the framework of the game-theory model, renunciation of assumption on availability of common knowledge to agents results to the models of reflexive games (Сhkhartish-vili and Novikov, 2004) . At that, Nash equilibrium "turns" into the more general informational equilibrium when each agent realizes the informational reflexion, i.e. use not only its information about essential parameters in process of decisionmaking, but also its ideas about ideas of other agents about these parameters, ideas about ideas about ideas, and so on. Therefore considering the effects of strategical reflexion "by analogy" is of great interest.
REFLEXIVE PARTITIONS
Let us note that within the framework of the indicator behavior hypothesis it is implicitly assumed that the agent choosing its actions in accordance with procedure (4) do not think about that the other agents act in such a way. If the agent begins to think about this (realizes reflexion) making decisions at the moment t, it should look for the best response to the actions of other agents predicted within the frameworks of expression (4). That is, the goal position would be determined by not expression (3) but as follows:
x  is defined by expression (4). At that it is assumed that the reflexing agent of the first rank considers all other agents as non-reflexing that corresponds to the tradition of the reflexive games where it is supposed that the agent possessing some rank of strategical reflexion considers all other agents as possessing the rank less by unity than its own one (Сhkhartishvili and Novikov, 2004) .
Similarly, one can consider the agents with more high ranks of reflexion. For that, let us define  = {N 0 , N 1 , …, N m } as the partitioning of the agents set N, where N i is the set of agents with i-th rank of reflexion, i = 0, m , m is the maximum rank of reflexion. Let us call  by the reflexive partition. Let us suppose that the agent with some rank of reflexion k reliably knows the sets of agents with all lower ranks k' (where k' < k -1) and considers all agents with equal or higher ranks (k''  k) as possessing the rank less by unity than its own rank (i.e. k -1). This reflects the assumption about that the agent excludes existence of agents with the same or higher rank of reflexion that its own one. At that the agent can incorrectly estimate the sets of agents with (k -1)-th, k-th, and higher ranks of reflexion.
MODELS OF REFLEXIVE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR
Let the vector x 0 of initial actions of the agents be given. Let us consider the following dynamic reflexive model of decision-making realized by those agents simultaneously keeping in mind that the respective expressions for the one-step "game" model can be obtained as a particular case where the decisions are made once with
Zero reflexion rank. Let us suppose that the agents with zero reflexion rank (belonging to the set N 0 ) choose their actions reckoning that the actions of other agents will be the same just as in the previous time interval. In other words, from (4) it follows that First reflexion rank. The j-th agent possessing the first rank of reflexion (j  N 1 ) supposes that all other agents possess the zero reflexion rank and "predicts" their choice in compliance with expression (6). Therefore, its own choice 1 t j x is guided by the best response to the environment that must arise from its point of view:
Second reflexion rank. Let us reckon that each agent j possessing the second reflexion rank (j  N 2 ) knows reliably the set N 0 and considers all the agents from the set N 1  N 2 \ {j} as possessing the first reflexion rank. Note that in general case, when there are several agents with the second reflexion rank, this agent mistakenly thinks that they have the first reflexion rank. Thereby it can "predict" behavior of all its opponents. Therefore its choice will be the best response to that environment that must arise from its point of view:
The agents with zero and first reflexion ranks will behave in accordance with expressions (6) and (7), respectively.
k-th reflexion rank (k  m).
The behavior of the agents with kth rank of reflexion is described similar to the three cases considered above (zero, first, and second maximum ranks of reflexion) taking into account the following agents' awareness structure. Let  jk be the subjective reflexive partition. This is the notions of the agent j with k-th rank of reflexion about the partition of all agents to reflexion ranks:
Let us note that within the framework of expression (9) the agent possessing k-th rank of reflexion has the right notions about the reflexion ranks of all the agents with strictly lesser ranks of reflexion.
The awareness structure is determined by the aggregate of the reflexion partitions of all the agents. If we assume that the agents' notions about their reflexion ranks is described by expression (9), then the awareness structure is uniquely defined by the reflexive partition .
k-th level agent chooses its actions as
In the "static" case k-th level agent chooses its actions
The vector
of agents actions will be referred to as the reflexive equilibrium of the game Г  = {N, F i () i  N , }. In the framework of the introduced above assumptions, reflexive equilibrium always exists. Note that the reflexive equilibrium is rather "exotic", as actions, chosen by the agents, are not their best responses to the opponents actions.
Modifying the reflexive partition one can modify the actions of the agents, i.e. realizes the reflexive control (see also the game-theory models of the reflexive control in (Сhkhartish-vili and Novikov, 2004) ).
The general model introduced in this section unlikely allows to obtain within its framework any general analytical conclusion. Nevertheless, it can serve as a basis for development of particular analytical or general simulation models allowing to describe and predict the collective behavior (of people, mobile robots, software-based agents) in various situations, see examples below. One can hope to obtain the analytical results introducing one or another simplifying assumption. For instance, below we consider the "game" model with homogeneous agents and aggregated influence of the game environment to the gain of each of them.
GAME OF HOMOGENEOUS AGENTS
Let: 1) all the agents from the set N have equal goal functions (
2) the goal function of i-th agent depends on its action x i (at that it is continuous and concave with respect to this variable) and on the aggregated situation Q(x), where Q():  n   1 is the symmetric function of its arguments; 3) the agents make decisions once (therefore the upper superscript corresponding to the first time interval will further be omitted); 4) the initial vector of actions x 0 and the reflexive partition  are fixed.
The agents with the zero rank of reflexion in accordance with expression (6) will choose the actions
The agents with the first rank of reflexion in accordance with expression (7) will choose the actions
The agents with the second rank of reflexion in accordance with expression (8) will choose the actions (14) 6. EXAMPLES Let us consider two examples illustrating the reflexion effects in the collective behavior models.
Consensus problem
The substantial interpretation of the "consensus problem" is as follows. The agents' actions correspond to their positions at the straight line (space coordinates, opinions, etc., see reviews in Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009 ). The aggregated situation corresponds to the mean value of the agents'
 . Let us consider the agent "deviation" from the aggregated situation
as the goal function. Let the "variance" of agents' positions
be the performance criterion (in this example, the goal function of the center depends not only on the game aggregated situation but also on the whole vector of the agents' actions). The model is trivial from game-theoretical point of view: if goal functions of the agents are common knowledge among them, the agents would easily compute that any vector of equal actions is Nash equilibrium. Let us note that in this situation there is no the conflict of the agents' interests at all, and any Nash equilibrium also simultaneously maximizes performance criterion (16). However, in the case of the agents' collective behavior in conditions of their incomplete awareness, the situation is not so simple.
Rank 0. Given initial positions of the agents x 0 , the i-th agent in accordance with expression (10) will choose the action (17) equal to the mean position of the other agents, i  N. The drawn conclusion remains valid also in the case, when the agents' goal functions depend not on the aggregated situation, but on the aggregated environment:
From expression (17) it follows that Q(x) = Q(x 0 ), i.e. the mean value of the agents' coordinates does not change, and the value of the performance criterion increases by (n -1) 2 times:
Rank 1. Let we have n 1 agents possessing the first rank of reflexion, and other n 0 = n -n 1 have the zero reflexion rank. The zero reflexion rank agents will choose the actions defined by expression (11), whereas the first rank agents will choose the following actions:
If all the agents possess the first reflexion rank, then Q(
), i.e. the mean value of the agents'
coordinates does not change. Such the case is ideal in the view of stability of the reflexive partition, because all the agents observe the expected values. The performance criterion value increases by any more (n -1) 2 times:
Let us consider an example with n = 2. We obtain that, depending on their ranks, the agents will choose the following actions: x One can see that, firstly, the vector of actions of both agents possessing the second reflexion rank coincide with the vector of actions of non-reflexing agents. Secondly, with equal reflexion ranks of both agents, the performance criterion value does not depend on the rank. Thirdly, all four possible combinations of the agents' actions are exhausted by the zero and first ranks of their reflexion. Fourthly, the maximum (equal to zero) value of performance criterion (16) is achieved in the case when either of agents has the zero reflexion rank, and another one possesses the first rank of reflexion. Hence, in the considered example, the maximum advisable rank of reflexion is equal to one.
Stock market pricing
Let us consider the game-theory model of the stock market, where each agent at each point of time has some quantity of money and asset which can be bought and sold at the existing market price. Note that the dynamic balance constraints are fulfilled for the mentioned quantity. The existing market price depends on both the trend  (external factor being the common knowledge) and correlation between the demand and supply, since with growth of the demand the market price of the asset increases, and with growth of the supply it decreases. Under common knowledge between agents about all the game parameters the structure of Nash equilibrium is such that all the agents buy the assets spending all available money (if they thereby "increase" the relative price of the assets), or all the agents sell all available assets (if they thereby "decrease" the relative price of the assets).
Let each agent have the amount of money u 0  0 and the asset x 0  0 at the start time. At that moment each agent has two alternatives. Either the agent can buy the asset to the whole amount u 0 , or it can sell all the asset x 0 (at that, the market is not constrained).
Depending of the agent actions x, the following price forms. If all the agents buy the assets, then the price p becomes p + = p 0 +  +  n x 0 . If the agents sell the assets, then the price p becomes p -= p 0 +  - n x 0 , where  is the coefficient of dependence of the price on demand/supply. The initial value of the agent performance function is equal to u 0 + x 0 p 0 , the final value is equal to To ascertain which of the three actions (buying, selling, doing nothing) will be undertaken by the rational agent, it is necessary to compare the three obtained values. We derive that if the positive (  0) or zero ( = 0) trend takes place, the asset should be bought. In the case of negative trend ( < 0) the situation is more complex, namely, the asset should be bought on condition that   00 0 0 0
The latter condition means that if the agents buying the asset and thus increasing its price in the next time interval can "overcome" the negative trend, then the asset should be bought. Otherwise, the asset should be sold.
If we approach to this more correctly and analyze all correlations between the parameters, i.e. for each of three actions find the conditions under which this action is optimal, then we obtain that the rational agent must adhere to the following algorithm. The agent must buy the asset if condition (19) holds true and sell it otherwise. It is interesting that the passive behavior (no action) is not profitable for any combination of the model parameters.
So we described the actions of non-reflexing agents. Let us now consider the reasoning of the reflexing agent with first rank. If condition (19) holds true, then the agent can predict that all the zero-rank agents would buy the assets. If condition (19) does not holds, then the agent can predict that all the zero-rank agents would sell the assets (its price would de-crease), and it is profitable to act in the same way. We obtain that the actions of the reflexing agents will be the same as these of the non-reflexing ones, i.e. addition of the reflexing agents to the considered model does not change the market price.
The drawn conclusion is the consequence of the fact that we considered sufficiently "intellectual" non-reflexing agents. Indeed, it was assumed that they are able to predict the market price change depending of their actions.
Let us consider another model with less "intellectual" zerorank agents, namely, assume that they are guided only by the trend. Then under the positive trend the zero-rank agents will buy the assets, as the result the asset price will growth, and the reflexing agents will have no choice but to follow their example. The situation changes under the negative trend. The zero-rank agents will sell the assets, as the result the price will "decrease yet more." But the reflexing agents can try to "overcome the trend" via their actions (buying the assets). To do this, in fact, they have to be confident, firstly, that the fraction q of the reflexing agents is the common knowledge between them, and secondly, that this fraction is sufficient for the price growing. By analogy with (19), the latter condition can be formulated as follows:
Let us note that the crucial fraction q * of the reflexing agents constitutes no less than a half of the total number of the agents (the condition q *  1 is equivalent to condition (19)). Consider a numerical example. Let n = 100, u 0 = 1000, p 0 = 10, x 0 = 100,  = 0.001,  = -1. Condition (19) holds true. From expression (20) it follows that q * = 53 %.
Let us emphasize that the assumption about that the fraction of the reflexing agents is the common knowledge between them contradicts to the introduced above assumption about the structure of the subjective reflexive partitions (see expression (9)), since the latter supposes that the reflexing agents "do not know about existence" of other agents with the same reflexion rank (and superior ranks). The market price growth under the negative trend will be caused by any reflexive partition, at which the fractions of the reflexing agents with any rank (excepting zero rank) exceed q * in total, and this information is the common knowledge between the reflexing agents of the respective levels. This statement having transparent substantial interpretations indicates that the structure of the subjective reflexive partitions defined by expression (9) is not solely possible and suitable to all the models being of practical interest. That is, considering other structures of the subjective reflexive partitions seems to be a promising direction for future research.
CONCLUSION
The method of reflexive partitioning of the set of the rational agents to the subsets of the agents possessing different ranks of the strategical reflexion allows:
 in the view of the decision-making theory, to extend the class of the collective behavior models for the intellectual agents acting together in conditions of incomplete awareness and lack of common knowledge;
 from the descriptive point of view, to extend the set of situations that, within the model framework, can be "explained" as the stable outcomes of interaction between the agents, respectively, within the frameworks of control problems, i.e. to extend the controllability domain;
 from the normative point of view, to state and solve the problems of group control owing to the choice of the agents' awareness structure.
Analysis of the examples allows to state that the presence of the reflexing agents can modify the group behavior in the different ways. In the example "Consensus problem," introducing the reflexing agents extends the set of action vectors chosen by the agents resulting in increase of the performance criterion. In the example "Stock market pricing," it is shown that only the certain "critical mass" of the reflexing agents can change the situation (in comparison with non-reflexing decision-making).
